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963 
Shook: Litigation, Regulation, and Legislation Strategies to 
Better Protect Oklahoma’s Earthquake Insurance 
Policyholders 
The relatively recent and increasingly frequent rash of earthquakes 
plaguing the state has shaken Oklahomans and their insurers. While the 
number of Oklahoma residents with earthquake insurance policies and 
endorsements has risen with the occurrence of seismic activity, this emerging 
market for insurers is under-regulated and provides scant protection for 
policyholders.
1
 Much litigation in the arena of Oklahoma’s earthquakes has 
been devoted, with varying degrees of success, to direct challenges from 
property owners against the oil and gas operations believed to be responsible 
for the induced earthquake outbreak in the state.
2
  
While individuals seem willing to bring this fight, insurers have been 
notably absent.
3
 Though insurance companies have the legal right to seek 
compensation from a source of the damage through the doctrine of 
subrogation,
4
 they have thus far been unwilling to enforce this right. Instead, 
they have left their insureds with shocking claim denial rates.
5
 Accordingly, 
Oklahoman insureds have been left to their own devices in remedying the 
damages resulting from the state’s earthquakes. This Comment will argue 
that a combination of litigation, regulation, and legislative action will better 
hold absent insurers accountable during this unprecedented time in the state’s 
history.  
After briefly explaining the development of Oklahoma’s earthquake crisis, 
Part I of this Comment will argue that the state’s earthquake insurance 
policyholders would be better served at this time by pursuing litigation 
against their insurers rather than the oil and gas industry itself. Specifically, 
this Comment will highlight and advocate for the use of the often-overlooked 
doctrine of illusory insurance coverage as a potential source of relief. Part II 
will assert that while the Oklahoma Insurance Department and its 
Commissioner have taken valuable steps towards recognizing a lack of 
accountability from insurers handling earthquake claims, more stringent 
regulation under the Commissioner’s authority and the Unfair Claims 
                                                                                                             
 1. Michael Thrasher, Oklahoma Insurance Regulators Still Face an Unprecedented 
Risk, FORBES (July 28, 2016, 4:05 PM EDT), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelthrasher/ 
2016/07/28/oklahoma-insurance-regulators-still-face-an-unprecedented-risk/#3e6d0b851536 
(“More Oklahomans are buying earthquake insurance than ever before . . . .”). 
 2. See infra Section I.A.  
 3. See infra Section I.B. 
 4. See infra Section I.B. 
 5. See infra Section I.B. 
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Settlement Practices Act (UCSPA) is necessary. Finally, Part III will contend 
that the Oklahoma Legislature should establish a state-managed earthquake 
insurance authority, similar to the authority established by California in 
response to the infamous Northridge Earthquake of 1994.
6
 Because litigation 
is the most readily available of these proposed solutions for Oklahoma’s 
policyholders, this Comment will spend the better part of its text addressing 
this avenue. To most effectively protect Oklahomans with earthquake 
insurance, however, its citizens and officials should confront each of these 
three facets—litigation, regulation, and legislation—contemporaneously. 
Preface: A Brief History of Oklahoma’s Earthquakes 
While the earthquake outbreak across the South and Midwest is a recent 
phenomenon,
7
 some scholarship has already addressed emerging legal and 
environmental issues presented by the outbreak.
8
 That scholarship, however, 
has focused mainly on the underlying causes and development of earthquakes 
throughout states, including Oklahoma.
9
 Although this Comment primarily 
focuses on the insurance industry’s response—or lack thereof—to the 
pandemic, some explanation of the likely tie between these earthquakes and 
the oil and gas industry provides a necessary context for this Comment. 
There remains little scientific doubt that oil and gas operations have 
induced the seismic activity permeating Oklahoma.
10
 Early causal studies of 
increased earthquakes focused largely on hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) 
practices but yielded little evidence connecting fracking to earthquakes and 
                                                                                                             
 6. The Northridge Earthquake was the most destructive earthquake in California since 
1906 and the costliest ever. Northridge Earthquake of 1994, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Northridge-earthquake-of-1994 (last visited Jan. 7, 2020).  
 7. See New Earthquake Hazards Program: Lists, Maps, and Statistics, USGS, https:// 
www.usgs.gov/natural-hazards/earthquake-hazards/lists-maps-and-statistics (last visited Feb. 
25, 2020) (denoting an almost 50% decrease in earthquakes in Oklahoma between 2011 and 
2012, followed by a 300% increase in the number of earthquakes between 2012 and 2013, a 
560% increase between 2013 and 2014, and a 150% increase in earthquakes between 2014 
and 2015).  
 8. See, e.g., Darlene A. Cypser & Scott D. Davis, Liability for Induced Earthquakes, 9 
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 551 (1994); Lucas Satterlee, Comment, Injecting Earthquakes into the 
Energy Debate, 34 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 221 (2016). 
 9. See Cypser & Davis, supra note 8. 
 10. According to the USGS, Oklahoma “has the most induced earthquakes in [the] US,” 
with only 1% to 2% linked to hydraulic fracturing. Earthquake Hazards: Induced 
Earthquakes, USGS, https://www.usgs.gov/natural-hazards/earthquake-hazards/induced-
earthquakes?qt-science_support_page_related_con=4#qt-science_support_page_related_con 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2020). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/7





 As the frequency of earthquakes intensified, so too did the 
research into the underlying causes. Oklahoma quickly rose through the ranks 
of earthquake-prone states, reporting double the earthquakes of California in 
2014 before “becom[ing] the most seismically active state in the country” in 
2015.
12
 In that same year, after much public debate and deliberation, the 
Oklahoma Geological Survey declared the primary cause of seismicity to be 
the injection of wastewater associated with oil and gas production.
13
 This 
evidentiary connection explained the proliferation of earthquakes throughout 
the state, specifically the even higher cluster of quakes near Jones, Oklahoma, 
a town located in the crosshairs of four wastewater injection wells.
14
  
The scientific, commercial, and legislative community in Oklahoma is 
actively debating and implementing strategies to curb the use of wastewater 
injection wells and mitigate the harm resulting therefrom.
15
 Professor Monika 
Ehrman of the University of Oklahoma College of Law has published an 
overview of these attempts and their corresponding scientific rationales.
16
 As 
a result of this general scholarly consensus on induced quakes, the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission has taken and continues to take action limiting 
wastewater and injection well activities.
17
 These solutions may better protect 
Oklahoma’s environment and prospectively address earthquake-related 
injury, but because these programs largely ignore the insurance industry, a 
gap in the scholarship exists regarding available redresses for insured 
Oklahomans seeking to repair earthquake damage.  
                                                                                                             
 11. Monika U. Ehrman, Earthquakes in the Oilpatch: The Regulatory and Legal Issues 
Arising Out of Oil and Gas Operation Induced Seismicity, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 609, 612 
(2017) (citing Matt Smith & Thom Patterson, Debate over Fracking, Quakes Gets Louder, 
CNN (June 15, 2012, 3:28 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/us/fracking-
earthquakes/index.html).  
 12. Id. (citing Paul O’Donnell, Days After Oklahoma Earthquake, Sierra Club Lawsuit 
Targets Chesapeake, Devon, and Others, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 17, 2016, 9:51 AM), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/2016/02/17/days-after-oklahoma-earthquake-
sierra-club-lawsuit-targets-chesapeake-devon-others/); see also Blake Watson, Hydraulic 
Fracturing and Tort Litigation: A Survey of Landowner Lawsuits, PROB. & PROP., Sept./Oct. 
2017, at 10, 14 (noting that, in 2015, Oklahoma averaged 2.5 seismic events per day).  
 13. Ehrman, supra note 11, at 639. 
 14. Id. at 624–25. 
 15. See id. at 638–41. 
 16. Id.  
 17. See Press Release, Okla. Corp. Comm’n, OCC Announces Next Step in Continuing 
Response to Earthquake Concerns (July 17, 2015), https://occeweb.com/News/DIRECTIVE-
2.pdf (suggesting a gradual curb in wastewater activity, particularly in areas near active or 
triggered fault lines).  
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Where there are human-made harms, there inevitably spring lawsuits 
seeking compensation. Tort litigation surrounding induced earthquakes has 
already developed in at least twelve states, the bulk of which have centered 
around seismic activity in Texas, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, West Virginia, and 
Oklahoma.
18
 University of Dayton Law School’s Professor Blake Watson has 
detailed the range of this litigation, all of which seems to focus on the oil and 
gas corporations allegedly responsible for the claimed harm.
19
 Plaintiffs have 
alleged claims for a variety of torts, spanning from nuisance to property 
damage.
20
 Invariably, these suits have led to a battle over causation. Most 
typically, and especially in litigation involving property damage, oil and gas 
defendants “deny that their disposal operations either caused the earthquakes 
in question or were the proximate cause of the alleged injuries.”
21
 Indeed, the 
question of proximate cause is the crux of these cases, and despite the general 
scientific consensus on the link between wastewater injection and 
earthquakes, the results of these claims have been mixed.
22
  
Because plaintiffs in these cases must prove not only general causation, 
but also a specific operation which created the harm at issue (for example: 
“waste well X caused damage Y”),
23
 individual plaintiffs often face an uphill 
battle. This Comment suggests that plaintiffs can altogether forego this 
causation dispute by focusing their attention on insurers, who, unlike gas 
companies, owe a fiduciary duty to their policyholders.
24
 If such litigation 
were to hold insurers to account for their unprecedentedly high denial rates 
for earthquake claims in Oklahoma, the insurers themselves may be 
prompted to hash out the causation issue with the oil and gas industry on a 
macro level, through subrogation.
25
  
                                                                                                             
 18. Watson, supra note 12, at 11. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 15. 
 22. See id. at 14–15.  
 23. Id. at 15 (“But, even if landowners are not required to establish fault (no pun 
intended), they will still be required to prove causation. This may be an insurmountable 
problem for two reasons: first, not all earthquakes are ‘induced’; and second, induced 
seismic activity is not easily linked to particular injection wells or to particular 
defendants.”).  
 24. Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 1977 OK 141, ¶ 32, 577 P.2d 899, 905 
(holding that insurers are “under a legal duty to act in good faith and deal fairly” with their 
policyholders). 
 25. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “subrogation” as “[t]he substitution of one party for 
another whose debt the party pays, entitling the paying party to rights, remedies, or securities 
that would otherwise belong to the debtor.” Subrogation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/7
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I. Earthquake Litigation in Oklahoma and the Role of the Courts in 
Protecting Earthquake Insurance Policyholders 
Complex litigation (either through mass joinder or class actions) relating to 
the Oklahoma earthquakes has thus far exhibited only a tangential 
relationship to insurance carriers. These attempts at large-scale litigation have 
pursued a variety of theories but yielded a mixed-bag of results.
26
 Although 
these cases have generally ignored insurers, they still contextualize the ability 
of mass litigation to address Oklahoma’s earthquake problem. Moreover, the 
shared difficulties of this litigation make even clearer why plaintiffs may be 
more successful in pursuing claims against insurance carriers, which in turn 
could take the fight to the powerful oil and gas industry. All of this litigation, 
massive or otherwise, was set in motion by a 2015 decision from Oklahoma’s 
highest court. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court opened the door to earthquake-related tort 
claims with its decision in Ladra v. New Dominion, LLC.
27
 Ladra presented 
an opportunity for the state’s high court to weigh in on the state’s seismic 
shake-up for the first time.
28
 The plaintiff in Ladra certainly suffered some of 
the most severe injuries in any of the Oklahoma earthquake litigation; a 5.0 
magnitude earthquake struck Sandra Ladra’s home in Prague, Oklahoma, 
causing far more than property damage.
29
 Intense shaking collapsed Ladra’s 
fireplace, sending stone tumbling, pinning down Ladra’s legs and knees.
30
 
Seeking compensation for her medical expenses, Ladra brought suit for 
compensatory and punitive damages, claiming the waste well disposal 
practice of New Dominion, LLC was the proximate cause of her injuries.
31
 
The extremity of this harm may well have caught the Oklahoma Supreme 




                                                                                                             
 26. See Watson, supra note 12, at 14–15 (providing a summary of cases filed in 
Oklahoma).  
 27. 2015 OK 53, 353 P.3d 529. 
 28. See id. ¶ 2, 353 P.3d at 530 (“Since approximately 2009, Oklahoma has experienced 
a dramatic increase in the frequency and severity of earthquakes.”).  
 29. Id. ¶ 3, 353 P.3d at 530. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 353 P.3d at 530. 
 32. The Ladra case quickly garnered national attention as a bellwether for Oklahoma 
earthquake litigation. See Miguel Bustillo & Daniel Gilbert, Energy’s New Legal Threat: 
Earthquake Suits, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2015, 1:22 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
frackings-new-legal-threat-earthquake-suits-1427736148.  
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The district court originally dismissed the Ladra case in deference to the 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC), holding that the OCC 
maintained exclusive jurisdiction over any case involving oil and gas 
operations.
33
 The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed and distinguished that 
while the OCC does retain exclusive jurisdiction over “the resolution of 
public rights,” the commission holds no authority over disputes between two 
or more private persons.
34
 Because this decision instructed that district courts 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over private tort actions even “when regulated 




A. Oklahoma Earthquake Mass Litigation So Far 
While Ladra authorized the beginning of most earthquake litigation in the 
state, mass-scale litigation in the area has generally struggled. A brief survey 
of these cases reveals a relatively unbroken chain of failures. Sierra Club v. 
Chesapeake Operating, LLC is the first of these unsuccessful attempts.
36
 
Sierra Club brought its multi-party claim not through the typical means of 
mass joinder or a Rule 23 class action, but through a specific provision of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
37
 which allows for private parties 
to sue any person “who ‘has contributed . . . to the . . . disposal of any solid or 
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to health or the environment.’”
38
 Pursuant to this Act, Sierra 
Club sought an order from the court requiring an array of oil and gas 
companies within Oklahoma to reduce the amount of wastewater they 
injected into the ground, while also establishing an earthquake monitoring 
center which would study the relationship between specific wells and 
corresponding quakes.
39
 Despite the then-recent Ladra ruling allowing for 
individual claims to proceed beyond the purview of the OCC, the Western 
District of Oklahoma dismissed this case before it ever gained traction.
40
 
The Western District recognized its jurisdiction over the injunctive relief 
sought but chose to decline that jurisdiction in deference to the OCC.
41
 Citing 
                                                                                                             
 33. Ladra, ¶ 4, 353 P.3d at 530. 
 34. Id. ¶ 10, 353 P.3d at 531. 
 35. Id. ¶ 13, 353 P.3d at 532. 
 36. 248 F. Supp. 3d 1194 (W.D. Okla. 2017). 
 37. Id. at 1198.  
 38. Id. at 1201 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2018)). 
 39. Id. at 1199. 
 40. Id. at 1209.  
 41. Id. at 1202–04. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/7
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the Burford abstention doctrine, which allows federal courts to decline 
jurisdiction in cases that implicate complex questions of state law and public 
policy,
42
 the court chose to exercise “the power to dismiss” the case at 
summary judgment.
43
 Accordingly, the first attempt at mass-scale litigation 
relating to Oklahoma’s earthquakes came to an early end. Though the court 
certainly had the option to allow the litigation to advance past the initial fact-
finding stage, it felt “ill-equipped to outperform the Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission in advancing [the] science” necessary to resolve Sierra Club’s 
environmental concerns as pleaded.
44
 If Ladra showed potential for litigation 
as a tool for combatting the state’s earthquake problem, Sierra Club warned 
of the difficulty in implementing such litigation on a complex, multi-party 
scale.  
The struggle of multi-plaintiff earthquake litigation at the federal level 
continued in Meier v. Chesapeake Operating L.L.C.
45
 Meier appears to be the 
only earthquake-related class action attempted in the state with even a 
tangential relationship to the insurance industry. Plaintiffs in Meier sought 
compensation for their earthquake insurance payments, not from the insurers 
themselves, but from the oil and gas companies who allegedly necessitated 
the need for homeowners’ earthquake insurance.
46
 Although this action 
originally began in the District Court of Payne County (a hotbed of seismic 
activity), defendants quickly removed the case to the Western District of 
Oklahoma (coincidentally before the same judge as Sierra Club) pursuant to 
the Class Action Fairness Act.
47
 Meier recognized that property owners in 
seismically active areas felt compelled to purchase earthquake insurance 
coverage with surprisingly high premiums but declared the remedy that the 
plaintiffs sought to be too attenuated.
48
 The court refused to recognize the 
proposed class’s requested relief, specifically holding that “the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, if confronted with the issue, would find the relief requested 
by plaintiffs not legally cognizable under the circumstances present in the 
case at bar.”
49
 Accordingly, the court dismissed the class petition,
50
 again 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. at 1202–03. The Burford abstention doctrine is a product of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
 43. Sierra Club, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 1204–05 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996)). 
 44. Id. at 1209. 
 45. 324 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (W.D. Okla. 2018). 
 46. Id. at 1210. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 1213. 
 49. Id. at 1215. 
 50. Id. at 1220.  
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signaling another failure for earthquake mass actions at the federal level. The 
plaintiffs’ bar has seemingly since recognized the need to adapt.  
Signs of success for class action earthquake litigation, where they exist, 
appear at the state court level. The most successful mass action in Oklahoma 
is the Lincoln County class action, Cooper v. New Dominion, LLC, which 
survived the pleading stage.
51
 Cooper asserted a class of Oklahoma-citizen 
property owners who lived in one of nine named counties and suffered 
property damage resulting from earthquakes in November of 2011.
52
 The 
specificity of this class definition seems to have benefitted the claimants, as 
the district court certified them for class treatment in July of 2018.
53
 The 
court specifically ruled that because “the common and core liability issue is 
whether Defendant’s wastewater operations caused the earthquakes in 
question,” common issues predominated the class members’ claims and 
certification was appropriate.
54
 Though the defendants immediately appealed 




While this settlement provides no clarity for whether this class claim could 
survive procedural scrutiny or prove persuasive to a trier of fact, it still 
signals unprecedented progress for complex earthquake-based litigation in 
the state. Even if the claims in Cooper were not settled, however, the 
plaintiffs would have still been confronted with the difficult task of proving 
that a specific earthquake induced by a specific injection well caused damage 
to a specific property.
56
 Instructively for future plaintiffs, including those 
                                                                                                             
 51. No. CJ-2015-24 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Lincoln Cty. Jan. 18, 2019). 
 52. Journal Entry Regarding Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification Pursuant to 12 
O.S. § 2023 at 2, Cooper, No. CJ-2015-24 (filed July 18, 2018) (on file with the Oklahoma 
Law Review).  
 53. Id. Though the case is a Lincoln County proceeding and filed as such, it was 
reassigned to Judge Lori Walkley in the District Court of Cleveland County.  
 54. Summary Order at 3, Cooper, No. CJ-2015-24 (filed May 22, 2018) (on file with the 
Oklahoma Law Review). 
 55. In January of 2019, the Cleveland County court approved an agreed class settlement 
and dismissed the case with prejudice. Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice as to Plaintiff, the Settlement Class, and Spess, Equal Energy, and Fairfield, 
Cooper, No. CJ-2015-24 (Jan. 18, 2019). 
 56. There does exist a split between state courts as to whether hydraulic fracturing and 
wastewater injection constitutes an “abnormally dangerous” or “ultra-hazardous” activity for 
which a strict liability theory would apply. California, Indiana, and Utah have imposed some 
form of strict liability for oil and gas operations, while states such as Kansas and Mississippi 
have declined to do the same; Oklahoma does not seem to have a case directly addressing 
the issue. Blake A. Watson, Fracking and Cracking: Strict Liability for Earthquake Damage 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/7
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pursuing the theories proposed in this Comment, Cooper may also indicate 




B. But Where Are the Insurers? Low Payouts and High Premiums from 
Insurers of Earthquake Risk 
As earthquakes have become more frequent throughout the state, more 
Oklahomans are turning to their insurers for protection. But these 
policyholders are receiving little in return for their premium dollars. While 
specific numbers for each insurance company are not publicly available,
58
 the 
premiums written by the insurance industry as a whole for earthquake 
coverage in Oklahoma have increased by millions in recent years.
59
 The 
approval of higher rates is likely the underlying driver of these inflated 
premiums.
60
 As more property owners seek coverage, insurers have 
unilaterally appealed to the Oklahoma Insurance Department, seeking 
approval for higher and higher rates, culminating in rate increases of more 
than 300% since 2011.
61
 Insurers have justified the need for these higher rates 
by citing the rising frequency of earthquakes in the state, which generates 
more insurance claims from policyholders.
62
 And yet, while the frequency of 
                                                                                                             
Due to Wastewater Injection and Hydraulic Fracturing, 11 TEX. J. OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 1, 
6–9 (2016). 
 57. Admittedly, class actions are often difficult to keep in state courts due to removal 
under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). See 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2018). However, 
smaller mass actions (with fewer than 100 plaintiffs) and CAFA’s in-state controversy 
exception allow state courts to maintain/retain jurisdiction. See Bridewell-Sledge v. Blue 
Cross of Cal., 798 F.3d 923, 928–30 (9th Cir. 2015); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 
945, 953 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 58. The Oklahoma Insurance Department does provide that premiums on earthquake 
policies and policy endorsements can add $50 to $300 per year in premiums. Mulready Says 
Get Ready: Earthquakes, OKLA. INS. DEP’T, https://www.oid.ok.gov/consumers/ insurance-
basics/disasters/earthquakes (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).  
 59. See generally Lacie Lowry, Increase in Oklahomans Buying Earthquake Insurance, 
NEWS 9 (Jan. 7, 2015, 6:15 PM CST), https://www.news9.com/story/27786943/increase-in-
oklahomans-buying-earthquake-insurance.  
 60. A “rate,” in insurance terms, is understood as the “value of insured losses expressed 
as a cost per unit of insurance.” Glossary of Insurance Terms, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, 
https://www.naic.org/consumer_glossary.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2020). 
 61. Heide Brandes, Oklahoma Regulators Raise Concerns on Quake Insurance Rate 
Hikes, REUTERS (May 24, 2016, 3:22 PM), https://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/ 
idAFL2N18L15K.  
 62. See id.  
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quakes has generally increased,
63
 very few policyholders have been able to 
collect on their earthquake claims.  
The Oklahoma Insurance Department (OID) has noted the incongruity of 
insurance rates to claim payouts, but has not provided resolution to or 
explanation for the problem. In June of 2016, the department’s 
Commissioner, John Doak, declared the earthquake insurance market a 
“noncompetitive line of insurance,” citing a series of irregularities in the 
industry.
64
 After granting years of rate increases, the OID eventually decided 
that “insurers making such filings have not substantiated their need for 
increased rates based on objective criteria” or actuarial experience.
65
 
Moreover, while 119 insurance companies offer earthquake insurance to 
Oklahomans, four insurers have constantly held over 50% of the state’s 
market share.
66
 Indeed, any market with few competitors each selling an 
increasingly more expensive product is far from competitive.
67
 Even since the 
Commissioner issued this directive, major insurers have withdrawn from the 
Oklahoma earthquake insurance market altogether. Farmers Insurance 
Company, for example, informed the OID in late 2016 that it was 
withdrawing earthquake coverage from the state because “our earthquake 
exposure and pricing in Oklahoma are not sustainable.”
68
 It seems then that 
insurers may have struggled to comport with the OID’s requirements, at least 
with respect to rate filings.  
More telling for policyholders, however, the OID found that insurers are 
making lucrative profits by selling earthquake coverage in the state, as 
“evidenced by an average loss ratio over the six years preceding December 
31, 2015 of approximately 3%.”
69
 The department deemed this ratio to be 
“unreasonable.”
70
 An insurer’s “loss ratio” refers to the number of losses 
                                                                                                             
 63. See supra note 7. 
 64. Order In re: Earthquake Insurance Rates, No. 16-0391-TRN, at 3 (Okla. Ins. 
Comm’r June 6, 2016), https://www.oid.ok.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/060716_16-
0391-TRN-GCA-Order-In-Re-Earthquake-Insurance-Rates.pdf. 
 65. Id. at 2. The order does not list the identities of these carriers. 
 66. Id. at 2–3. 
 67. See id. at 3 (“The concentration of the market and the reticence of consumers to lose 
‘package discounts’ constitutes an economic barrier that could prevent new firms from 
entering the market.”). 
 68. Farmers – OK EQ FAQ Final, SERFF Filing Access, NAIC (Submission Date: 
10/28/16) (SERFF Tracking Number: FARM-130786205), https://filingaccess.serff.com/ 
sfa/home/OK. 
 69. See Order In re: Earthquake Insurance Rates, supra note 64, at 3.  
 70. Id.  
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divided by premium dollars collected.
71
 By way of comparison, the average 
loss ratio for all insurers across all lines of insurance coverage in the same 
year was 69.3%.
72
 This “unreasonably” low ratio, married with continuous 
rate increases has defined the current state of earthquake insurance in 
Oklahoma: high premium rates for policyholders, low payouts from insurers.  
While a low loss ratio necessarily implies few claim payouts, the existing 
data on earthquake claim payments in Oklahoma further confirms this 
implication.
73
 In another 2015 bulletin to insurers, the OID specifically noted 
“the extraordinary denial rate of earthquake claims that the preliminary data 
seems to indicate.”
74
 Although the bulletin did not disclose the specifics of 
this “preliminary data,” further analysis submitted to the U.S. Department of 
Insurance indicates that the OID was referring to the fact that insurers had 
only paid out on 8% of earthquake claims at that time.
75
 The years following 
continued the trend noted in the report. Despite the generally ongoing rise in 
earthquakes across the state, insurers appear to have paid approximately 16% 
of all earthquake insurance claims filed in the state since the beginning of the 
earthquake outbreak in 2010.
76
 Few claims payouts do not automatically 
indicate bad faith or malicious practices on the part of insurers, and the 
                                                                                                             
 71. For example, a high-loss ratio would approach or exceed 100%, effectively meaning 
that the insurer is either losing money or making as much in premiums as it is paying out in 
indemnity. A ratio of more than 100% would equate to a net loss. See Glossary of Insurance 
Terms, supra note 60 (defining loss ratio as “the percentage of incurred losses to earned 
premiums”).  
 72. Brian Briggs & Bree Wilson, U.S. Property and Casualty Insurance Industry—2017 
First Half Results, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, https://www.naic.org/documents/ 
topic_insurance_industry_snapshots_2017_industry_analysis_reports.pdf (last visited Jan. 
18, 2020). 2016 was not an anomalous year, as the average loss ratios in 2016 and 2017 were 
71.4% and 73%, respectively. Id. 
 73. See JOHN D. DOAK, OKLA. INS. COMM’R, EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE BULLETIN NO. PC 
2015-02: EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE, EXCLUDED LOSS, INSPECTION OF INSURED PROPERTY AND 
ADJUSTER TRAINING (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.oid.ok.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
2019/10/030415_Earthquake-Bulletin-3-3-15.pdf [hereinafter BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02]. 
 74. Id. at 2. 
 75. FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT ON PROTECTION OF 
INSURANCE CONSUMERS AND ACCESS TO INSURANCE 12 (Nov. 2016), https://www. 
treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/2016_FIO_Consumer_Report. 
pdf. 
 76. Corey Jones & Curtis Killman, Earthquake Insurance: 3 in 20 Claims Approved in 
Oklahoma Since 2010, TULSA WORLD (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.tulsaworld.com/ 
earthquakes/earthquake-insurance-in-claims-approved-in-oklahoma-since/article_de588725-
1475-592c-9025-bdcfbf9b8bcd.html. This number comes from data provided directly from 
the OID to the local press on 1800 filed earthquake damage claims, with only 292 of them 
receiving payment. Id.  
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Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner made as much clear in the local press.
77
 
Still, these low payout numbers are certainly consistent with and explanatory 
of the “unreasonably” low loss ratios the OID described.  
Despite the broad recalcitrance towards indemnifying insurance claims, 
insurers maintain a unique position through which they could lead the charge 
to hold the oil and gas industry accountable for damage caused by induced 
earthquakes in Oklahoma. Because of the long-recognized doctrine of 
subrogation, insurers maintain the ability to recoup the amount paid to 
insureds by seeking compensation from third parties responsible for the 
damage.
78
 Oklahoma courts have succinctly characterized subrogation as “the 
equitable right of an insurer to be put in the position of its insured so that it 
may pursue recovery from any third parties who are legally responsible to the 
insured for a loss paid by the insurer.”
79
 Logically, given the aforementioned 
scientific link between wastewater injection wells and earthquakes,
80
 insurers 
could apply the doctrine of subrogation against oil and gas companies 
responsible for damages to their insureds’ property. Just as individuals have 
recognized and pursued their right to seek compensation from the source of 
the state’s quakes, so too could insurers. In this vein, the Oklahoma 
Legislature has proposed a bill explicitly outlining the ability of insurers to 
seek subrogation for human-made earthquakes.
81
 The state’s Insurance 
Commissioner has recognized the already-existing ability of insurers to seek 
subrogation for such claims, however, and deemed the bill unnecessary 
because “[i]nsurers already have the right of subrogation in the state.”
82
  
                                                                                                             
 77. See Maureen Wurtz, Earthquake Damage Claims Rarely Paid by Insurance 
Companies, KTUL (Feb. 20, 2017), https://ktul.com/news/local/months-after-record-
oklahoma-quake-insurance-companies-slow-to-pay-for-damage. Commissioner John Doak, 
in this local news interview, explained, “Maybe as we’re looking at those denials, that may 
not mean that there’s not damage, it just may mean that it’s not reached the level of the 
insurance company to make a payment.” Id. (quoting John Doak, Oklahoma Insurance 
Commissioner at the time of the interview). 
 78. See generally Hanover Ins. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1308–09 
(N.D. Okla. 2002).  
 79. Id. (citing 16 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 222:5 (rev. 3d ed. 2000)). 
 80. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.  
 81. Brianna Bailey, Oklahoma Legislature Considers Two Bills on Earthquake 
Insurance Reforms, OKLAHOMAN (Feb. 25, 2016, 10:47 PM), https://oklahoman.com/ 
article/5481266/oklahoma-legislature-considers-two-bills-on-earthquake-insurance-reforms. 
 82. Id. Perhaps due to the Commissioner’s comments, the bill never gained much 
legislative traction. Senate Bill 1498 has yet to reach the state senate floor for any votes and 
appears to be effectively dead at the time of this writing. Bill Information for SB 1498, 
OKLA. STATE LEGIS., http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=sb1498&Session 
=1600 (last visited Jan. 18, 2020). 
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This right, however, is not without its limits and can be waived when 
insurers deny their policyholders’ claims. Oklahoma courts have specifically 
recognized that an insurer is estopped from raising a claim of subrogation 
after a policyholder has refused the insurer’s suggested settlement amount 
and the insurer has denied the claim.
83
 Given the high denial rate for 
earthquake claims, it is unsurprising that major insurers in the state have not 
pursued their subrogation right against oil and gas producers for earthquake 
damages.
84
 With such a low loss ratio and abnormally high profit margins, 
insurance companies may be reluctant to engage in what would surely be 
complex and expensive litigation, which has already produced uneven results 
for individual plaintiffs. Given that insurers are disinterested in pursuing a 
subrogation claim and pay such a low rate of filed claims, those individuals 
with earthquake insurance in Oklahoma may understandably feel that they 
are paying for functionally non-existent coverage.
85
 The relatively untested 
doctrines of reasonable expectations and illusory coverage, however, may 
provide these policyholders with a remedy.  
C. The Doctrines of Reasonable Expectations and Illusory Coverage May 
Allow Earthquake Policyholders to Give Meaning to Their Policies 
In some circumstances, courts may intervene to enforce the terms and 
spirit of insurance policies. Unlike the oil and gas industry,
86
 which has little 
direct contact with and owes few duties to the average Oklahoman whom 
earthquakes have harmed, insurers owe each of their policyholders an 
implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing.
87
 This duty transcends the 
written policy contract and “extends to all types of insurance companies and 
                                                                                                             
 83. Sexton v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 1991 OK 84, ¶ 21, 816 P.2d 1135, 1139. 
 84. Steadfast Insurance has filed a subrogation action against several oil and gas 
producers in the Northern District of Oklahoma for almost $400,000 in indemnity payouts, 
though no progression in this litigation seems apparent beyond the filing. Sarah Terry-Cobo, 
Steadfast Insurance Sues Oil and Gas Companies Over Earthquake Damage, J. REC. (Nov. 
28, 2018), https://journalrecord.com/2018/11/28/steadfast-insurance-sues-oil-and-gas-
companies-over-earthquake-damage/. 
 85. A news article from Glencoe, Oklahoma, while anecdotal, expressed this exact 
frustration. Upon denial of his earthquake claim, a local man complained that “[y]ou’re 
better off taking your money and going to the casino. I’m serious. You got a better chance of 
winning.” Sarah Stewart, Oklahoma Man Warning Others: Don’t Get Earthquake 
Insurance, OKLA.’S NEWS 4 (May 26, 2016, 6:49 PM CDT), https://kfor.com/2016/05/26/ 
oklahoma-man-warning-others-dont-get-earthquake-insurance/.  
 86. Of course, oil and gas companies owe basic duties to property owners as would any 
industry or individual. See generally Cypser & Davis, supra note 8, at 566–85.  
 87. Sizemore v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 2006 OK 36, ¶ 15, 142 P.3d 47, 51. 
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 The duty of good faith and fair dealing allows potential 
plaintiffs whose property is damaged from an earthquake to consider an 
action against their insurance carrier if their claims are denied before 
pursuing relief from the oil and gas industry.
89
 Although policyholders can 
seek recourse, including class actions and multi-plaintiff actions, for a 
violation of this duty, the fact-specific details required for a bad faith action 
fall beyond the scope of this Comment.
90
 All the same, the high denial rates 
of earthquake insurance claims in the state, partnered with the explanations of 
those denials, may encourage an action against insurers focused more 
specifically in the contracts doctrine of reasonable expectations and its 
progeny of illusory insurance coverage.
91
  
The language and enforcement of insurance contracts in Oklahoma are 
bound to certain principles of fairness to the policyholder under the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations.
92
 When courts choose to implement this doctrine, 
ambiguous or broad exclusions contained in insurance contracts cannot “be 
permitted to serve as traps for policy holders” and must be interpreted in a 
way favorable to facilitating the payment of claims.
93
 Generally, the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations as applied to insurance contracts ensures that 
policyholders receive the coverage they expect, despite complicated or 
otherwise unclear provisions that would deny the coverage in an unexpected 
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. (quoting Goodwin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 1992 OK 34, ¶ 6, 828 P.2d 431, 
432–33). The duty of insurers to deal with policyholders fairly and in good faith exists 
largely through the common law but is more defined and codified through Oklahoma’s 
version of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. 36 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1250.1–1250.17 
(Supp. 2018). 
 89. A claim denial, in itself, does not constitute bad faith claims handling or illusory 
coverage. See Luc Cohen, Insurers Shun Risk as Oil-Linked Quakes Soar in Oklahoma, 
REUTERS (May 12, 2016, 12:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-oklahoma-
earthquakes/insurers-shun-risk-as-oil-linked-quakes-soar-in-oklahoma-idUSKCN0Y30DC. 
For their part, insurers will claim that they often rely on outside experts and engineers to 
justify any denials that fall above policy deductibles. Id. 
 90. An insurance bad faith inquiry looks to whether an insurer deals fairly with its 
insured and pays the claim at issue promptly. Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 1977 
OK 141, ¶ 32, 577 P.2d 899, 905. 
 91. Contractual claims are often pleaded in tandem with insurance bad faith claims, 
even in past Oklahoma class actions. See, e.g., Burgess v. Farmers Ins. Co., 2006 OK 66, ¶ 
1, 151 P.3d 92, 93.  
 92. Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 1996 OK 28, ¶¶ 6–10, 912 P.2d 
861, 863–64. 
 93. Id. ¶ 24, 912 P.2d at 870. 
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 This is not to say that the clear language of insurance policies is not 
enforceable or cannot prevail, but there are instances where the existence of 




Despite Oklahoma’s adoption of reasonable expectations as applied to 
insurance contracts and provisions, the state has yet to explicitly endorse a 
doctrine that has derived from this principle in other jurisdictions: the 
doctrine of illusory insurance coverage.
96
 Though a suit directly pleading the 
existence of illusory coverage would likely create a case of first impression 
for Oklahoma courts and only apply in limited scenarios, the unique issues 
and astronomical denial rates of the state’s earthquake insurance claims may 
create an ideal case in which the courts could first apply the doctrine.
97
 
The illusory coverage doctrine may allow Oklahoman earthquake 
insurance policyholders to finally receive the coverage they expected when 
they purchased their policies. There is little jurisdictional consensus as to an 
exact enumeration of this doctrine, but most agree that it allows a 
policyholder to challenge a policy or endorsement that is functionally 
worthless as written or as enforced.
98
 Courts often find coverage to be 
illusory when some exclusion or addendum within the policy renders it 
generally ineffective for the policyholder.
99
 Accordingly, because exclusions 
that are either ambiguously vague (and thus over-inclusive in application), or 
specific but impracticably applied, may fit the definition of illusory, courts 
can compel insurers to pay out under policies that they had previously 
                                                                                                             
 94. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 961, 967–68 (1970).  
 95. Max True, ¶ 8, 912 P.2d at 865 (“The doctrine does not negate the importance of 
policy language.”). 
 96. The illusory coverage doctrine serves a similar purpose as the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations, namely “to qualify the general rule that courts will enforce an insurance 
contract as written.” Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
 97. Oklahoma courts have not yet explicitly endorsed the illusory coverage doctrine. 
However, the Oklahoma Insurance Department has referenced the doctrine with regards to 
insurers’ vague sale of “additional coverage” for wind and hail policies. See JOHN D. DOAK, 
OKLA. INS. COMM’R, EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE BULLETIN NO. PC 2016-02: LAWS AND 
ORDINANCES, ADDITIONAL COVERAGE; FORTIFIED HOME™—HIGH WIND AND HAIL PROGRAM 
2 (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.oid.ok.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/042516_Final-
Bulletin2.pdf. 
 98. Ian Weiss, Comment, The Illusory Coverage Doctrine: A Critical Review, 166 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1545, 1546 (2018).  
 99. See id. at 1548–50. 
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 Illusory coverage as a doctrine has largely developed on a state-by-
state basis, with several courts justifying the existence of the doctrine as 
serving an important policy interest in protecting the expectations of 
insureds.
101
 With the regulatory insurance body in Oklahoma declaring the 
earthquake insurance market “uncompetitive” and denial rates 
“unreasonable,” the state is certainly at a crisis point for the expectations of 
its insureds and should implement this doctrine.  
Earthquake insurance policies in Oklahoma may be especially susceptible 
to the illusory coverage doctrine because of two common exclusions found in 
the policies: an exclusion for human-made quakes and an exclusion for pre-
existing “earth settlement.” The illusory coverage doctrine most regularly 
applies to specific policy endorsements like earthquake coverage, rather than 
an insurance policy in its entirety.
102
 More specifically, courts might trigger 
the doctrine when a particular policy exclusion “reduces the possibility that a 
given piece of coverage will actually come in handy to the policyholder.”
103
 
This doctrine does not mandate that the exclusion must necessarily render 
collection under the policy impossible to be found “illusory.”
104
 The OID has 
recognized two such exclusions for earthquake policies, without explicitly 
defining them as illusory exclusions.  
In October 2015, the OID advised insurers to specifically note if their 
policies excluded human-made earthquakes, because current policy language 
                                                                                                             
 100. See id. at 1550. 
 101. Id. at 1552. Weiss argues that any supposed “public policy” underlying the doctrine 
ultimately derives from more codified sources of law. Id. He still recognizes, as have several 
courts, that many believe public policy to be the ultimate foundation of the doctrine. Id. at 
1552–54; see, e.g., Pompa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 520 F.3d 1139, 1145 (10th Cir. 
2008) (“[E]xclusions that render coverage illusory . . . might violate public policy.”); Point 
of Rocks Ranch, L.L.C. v. Sun Valley Title Ins. Co., 146 P.3d 677, 680 (Idaho 2006) 
(“When a policy only provides an illusion of coverage . . . [it] will be considered void as 
violating public policy.”) (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Dixon, 112 P.3d 
825 (Idaho 2005)). But see State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 687 P.2d 1139, 1142 
(Wash. 1984) (en banc) (“[W]e have been hesitant to invoke public policy to limit or avoid 
express contract terms . . . .”). 
 102. See Weiss, supra note 98, at 1556 (explaining that the issue “is whether a particular 
coverage provision is swallowed-up by an exclusion”) (quoting Great N. Ins. Co. v. 
Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 05-635, 2008 WL 2048354, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2008)); see 
also Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he 
doctrine of illusory coverage is best applied . . . where part of the premium is specifically 
allocated to a particular type . . . of coverage . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 103. Weiss, supra note 98, at 1559.  
 104. Id. at 1561.  
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“may be ambiguous as to the coverage afforded.”
105
 This ambiguity is exactly 
why the doctrine of illusory coverage exists. The OID warned of the danger 
of such uncertainty in a similar bulletin, published just months prior, 
expressing a “concern[] that insurers could be denying claims based on the 
unsupported belief that these earthquakes were the result of fracking or 
injection well activity.”
106
 An Oklahoman insurance policy that either 
expressly writes out or ambiguously excludes induced earthquakes, combined 
with consistent denials of coverage due to the human-made nature of the 
quakes from insurers, is a perfect recipe for policyholders to seek redress 
under the doctrine of illusory coverage. Given that Oklahomans appear to be 
purchasing earthquake coverage to protect themselves from these quakes
107
 
and because the scientific consensus that the rise in the state’s earthquakes is 
tied to human-made causes,
108
 it seems facially apparent that an insurance 




Even policyholders whose insurance does cover induced earthquakes may 
still reasonably feel as though their coverage is merely illusory.
110
 When the 
OID warned insurers with human-made exclusions, it also skeptically noted 
that many insurers are denying claims by asserting “pre-existing damage.”
111
 
While in that bulletin the OID did not note the exact kind of pre-existing 
                                                                                                             
 105. Scott Kersgaard, Oklahoma’s Doak Tells Insurers to Clarify Earthquake Coverage, 
INS. BUS. AM. (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-
news/oklahomas-doak-tells-insurers-to-clarify-earthquake-coverage-25980.aspx (quoting 
JOHN D. DOAK, OKLA. INS. COMM’R, EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-04 
(Oct. 9, 2015)). 
 106. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 2. The Pennsylvania Insurance 
Department issued a similar notice to carriers in its state. Penn.: Fracking Exclusion Not 
Allowed in Homeowners Earthquake Endorsements, INS. J. (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www. 
insurancejournal.com/news/east/2015/04/15/364460.htm. 
 107. See Thrasher, supra note 1. 
 108. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 109. The lack of coverage that policyholders reasonably expected is a consistent tenet of 
illusory coverage findings. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 774 F.3d 702, 709 
(11th Cir. 2014). 
 110. The OID issued a follow up to its original 2015-02 bulletin wherein it noted “the 
insurance industry has begun offering enhanced earthquake coverage that treats earthquakes 
caused by water disposal injection wells or hydraulic fracturing as covered events” 
indicating that fewer insurers now exclude induced quakes. JOHN D. DOAK, OKLA. INS. 
COMM’R, REVISED EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02: EARTHQUAKE 
INSURANCE, WATER DISPOSAL WELLS AND FRACKING (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.oid. 
ok.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/081015_EarthquakeBulletin.pdf [hereinafter REVISED 
BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02]. 
 111. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 2. 
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damage that insurers are citing, it has expressed elsewhere that “some of the 
most common exclusions for earthquake insurance are masonry (brick) 
veneer, vehicles and pre-existing damage.”
112
 To be clear, the mere existence 
of a pre-existing earth settlement exception in an earthquake policy is not 
prima facie illusory coverage,
113




Moreover, the Tenth Circuit has specifically noted that the words “earth 
movement” in an insurance policy are not inherently ambiguous.
115
 If, 
however, insurers are relying on this exception to overwhelmingly deny 
claims and are doing so without “inspect[ing] the property prior to inception 
of the coverage and maintain[ing] reasonably current information as to the 
condition of the insured property[] prior to loss,” as the OID has suggested,
116
 
then the coverage may be illusory all the same. Leaning on this particular 
exclusion, insurers may still not face a realistic risk of payment. A pre-
existing damage rationale for a claim denial, without a pre-loss understanding 
of the property at issue, surely seems to strain logic. An unsupported use of 
this exclusion to deny coverage that policyholders reasonably expect would 
create a strong inference for illusory coverage. The data on how regularly 
insurers deny earthquake claims in the state citing pre-existing settlement is 
not publicly available, though courts could likely compel insurers to produce 
such figures in litigation.
117
 
Were a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs to find that insurers frequently rely on 
this exclusion and do so without corroborating information regarding the 
damaged property, they may well be able to show that the insurers are 
“receiv[ing] premiums when realistically [they are] not incurring any risk of 
                                                                                                             
 112. Mulready Says Get Ready: Earthquakes, supra note 58. 
 113. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 32(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2019). All 
exclusions necessarily limit coverage and are not automatically illusory-rendering.  
 114. Some instances of ground settlement, including liquefaction and seismically-
induced landslides, may even directly result from earthquakes. See Ground Failure Scientific 
Background, USGS, https://earthquake.usgs.gov/data/ground-failure/background.php (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2020). 
 115. Davis-Travis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 336 F. App’x 770, 774 (10th Cir. 
2009). 
 116. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 2. 
 117. See Milinazzo v. State Farm Ins. Co., 247 F.R.D. 691, 696 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding 
that “documents related to the ‘investigation, processing, analysis’ and ultimate denial of 
Plaintiff’s claim are relevant” in a breach of contract case); see also 12 OKLA. STAT. § 
3226(A)(1) (Supp. 2018) (outlining that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss4/7





 If plaintiffs could similarly tie this reliance upon an unjustified 
and broad exception, it would further the likelihood that a court may compel 
payment from an insurer, despite an insurance company’s arguments that 
coverage may still be possible, even with the exclusion.
119
 Although an action 
for illusory coverage citing this exclusion could find success, it would likely 
be more difficult for plaintiffs than a similar action involving an outright 
exclusion of induced earthquakes, because of the factual fight likely to 
follow. 
Given the apparent similarity of earthquake claim denials among 
policyholders across the state and the recent spark of success in state-level 
mass litigation concerning earthquakes more generally,
120
 plaintiffs should 
consider banding together and bringing their illusory coverage claims as part 
of a class action. A class of purely Oklahoma-based citizens, with a 
concentrated focus on the issue of illusory coverage, may be attractive to 
Oklahoma policyholders and perhaps successful in state-level courts. Due to 
the likely number of policyholders affected by claim denials under what may 
be an illusory policy, a class action would likely promote economy, 
efficiency, and consistency in the adjudication of this state-wide issue.
121
 
Though such a class would likely have to overcome issues of predominance 
and individuality of claims and damages, Oklahoma may serve as a valuable 
venue all the same.
122
 Indeed, as research into the relatively certification-
friendly nature of Oklahoma class action law has suggested, “the cumulative 
effect of Oklahoma case law . . . may well be to make Oklahoma a more 
desirable forum for national state law class action litigation.”
123
 Accordingly, 
the facts of widespread earthquake claim denials and the landscape of the 
                                                                                                             
 118. Colo. Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency v. Northfield Ins. Co., 207 P.3d 839, 
843 (Colo. App. 2008) (quoting O’Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282, 285 (Colo. 
1985) (en banc)).  
 119. Martinez v. Idaho Ctys. Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d 902, 907 (Idaho 
2000) (finding illusory coverage when a part of a policy “affords no realistic protection to 
any group or class of injured persons,” despite “some small circumstance[s] where coverage 
could arguably exist”). 
 120. Referencing the aforementioned state-level class certification of earthquake victims 
in Cooper v. New Dominion, LLC, No. CJ-2015-000024 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Lincoln Cty. Jan. 
18, 2019). 
 121. See Steven S. Gensler, Civil Procedure: Class Certification and the Predominance 
Requirement Under Oklahoma Section 2023(B)(3), 56 OKLA. L. REV. 289, 290–91 (2003) 
(highlighting these factors in class certification).  
 122. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023(B)(3) (Supp. 2018) (requiring in pertinent part that 
“questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members”). 
 123. Gensler, supra note 121, at 326. 
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state’s class action jurisprudence may fuse to create a favorable venue for 
multi-plaintiff earthquake actions. 
II. The Regulatory Enforcement Power of the Oklahoma Insurance 
Department and Its Potential to Better Serve Earthquake Policyholders 
What appears lacking from Oklahoma Insurance Department publicly 
issued bulletins and instructions is any pattern of enforcement from the 
state’s Insurance Commissioner.
124
 Indeed, the OID’s bulletins indicate that 
the state’s insurance regulatory body has identified many concerns facing 
earthquake policyholders.
125
 By enforcing these existing memoranda, the 
OID could significantly alleviate the issues plaguing Oklahoma earthquake 
policyholders.  
The Oklahoma Insurance Code grants the state’s Insurance Commissioner 
and Insurance Department wide latitude to regulate—and if necessary, 
reprimand—insurers who choose to sell policies within the state.
126
 
Moreover, the OID and its Commissioner serve as a general gatekeeper to 
insurers who wish to practice in Oklahoma, as all insurers may only transact 
insurance in the state with the approval and license of the Department.
127
 To 
maintain its license and good standing in the state, an insurer must comply 
with all provisions of the Insurance Code and with the “charter powers” that 
the Code grants to the department and its Commissioner.
128
  
Chief among these “charter powers” is the Insurance Commissioner’s 
authority to regulate insurers consistent with Oklahoma’s adoption of the 
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.
129
 This Act prohibits insurance 
                                                                                                             
 124. Since the OID first issued bulletins pertaining to concerns in earthquake insurance, 
it has not issued a single public reprimand, bulletin, or Final Order punishing an insurer for 
violating the same. See Final Orders 2016, OKLA. INS. DEP’T, https://www.oid.ok.gov/about-
oid/divisions-programs/legal-division/final-orders/final-orders-2016/ (last visited Jan. 22, 
2020); Final Orders 2015, OKLA. INS. DEP’T, https://www.oid.ok.gov/about-oid/divisions-
programs/legal-division/final-orders/final-orders-2015/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2020); Bulletins, 
OKLA. INS. DEP’T, https://www.oid.ok.gov/about-oid/divisions-programs/legal-division/ 
bulletins/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2020).  
 125. See supra notes 73, 106 and accompanying text. 
 126. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 307.1 (Supp. 2018) (“The Commissioner may adopt reasonable 
rules and regulations for the implementation and administration of the provisions of the 
Insurance Code.”). 
 127. Id. § 607(A). 
 128. Id.; see also id. § 618 (granting the Insurance Commissioner the ability to refuse to 
renew or revoke an insurer’s license to operate if the insurer is (1) in violation of the Code, 
or (2) “no longer meets the requirements for the authority originally granted”). 
 129. Id. § 1250.13. 
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companies from conducting a wide range of dishonest dealings, pertinently 
including failing to comply with issued orders of the Commissioner.
130
 
Penalties for violations of the Insurance Code and subsequent orders range 
from revocation of the insurer’s license to other appropriate methods which 
would “limit, regulate, and control the insurer’s line of business.”
131
 
Compounded, these provisions of the Oklahoma Insurance Code allow the 
state’s Insurance Commissioner to set rules of practice for insurers and 
penalize insurers who fail to abide by those regulations. 
A. Recognized Issues Without Prescribed Solutions in the Oklahoma 
Insurance Department’s Earthquake Insurance Findings 
Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner John Doak’s first notable bulletin 
regarding earthquake insurance, Earthquake Insurance Bulletin No. PC 2015-
02, presented several actionable criteria for the department to enforce against 
insurers in the state. As previously mentioned, the Commissioner expressed 
concern that insurers, hesitant to enter into the debate over the causation of 
induced earthquakes, could be refusing to fulfill claims “on the unsupported 
belief” these quakes were human-made.
132
 Appearing to support 
enforcement, the Commissioner has advised that “[i]f that were the case, 
companies could expect the Department to take appropriate action to enforce 
the law.”
133
 This bulletin implies that the OID would take action to reprimand 
insurers who deny claims with an unsubstantiated claim that the earthquake 
was human-made, but public follow-up to this bulletin is nonexistent.
134
 
Moreover, the Commissioner signaled his intent to further investigate these 
unpaid claims through a market conduct exam, though the Commissioner has 
not conducted nor published the results of such an examination.
135
 
In the same bulletin, the Commissioner expressed his concerns regarding 
pre-existing damage claims and exclusions concerning earthquake damage.
136
 
                                                                                                             
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. § 1250.13(A). 
 132. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 2 (emphasis removed). 
 133. Id.  
 134. The Oklahoma Insurance Department website lists no public filings showing a 
follow-up that addresses these issues. See supra note 124. 
 135. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 3. The Commissioner has statutory 
authority to conduct such an evaluation. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 311.4(F) (Supp. 2018) (“The 
Insurance Commissioner may use market conduct annual statements or amendments or 
addendums . . . in determining compliance with the laws of this state and rules adopted by 
the Insurance Commissioner.”). This lack of evaluation may be because of OID’s revision of 
Bulletin PC 2015-02. See REVISED BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 110. 
 136. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 2. 
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Again, while litigation allows policyholders to challenge these disputes 
instantly, proactive measures from the OID may preempt the need for such 
litigation altogether. Through the bulletin, the Commissioner expressed 
concerns that while insurers have the right to exclude certain damage in 
earthquake claims attributed to pre-existing damage, insurers must actually 
inspect the property to engage these exceptions.
137
 Specifically, the 
Commissioner questioned if “insurers are employing fair claims practices” in 
these denials,
138
 presumably implicating the Unfair Claims Settlement 
Practices Act. As a solution to this worry, the Commissioner clarified his 
expectation that “[i]f an insurer intends to deny a claim, asserting [‘]pre-
existing’ damage, I expect that the insurer has inspected the property prior to 
inception of the coverage and maintained reasonably current information as 
to the condition of the insured property, prior to loss.”
139
 As already noted, 
this lack of justification for denied claims leaves insureds susceptible to 
functionally non-existent coverage.
140
 This susceptibility is especially 
unacceptable given that the Commissioner hinted here towards a follow-up 
market conduct exam that seems to have never taken place.
141
 
Lastly, in the 2015-02 bulletin, the Commissioner expressed his 
expectation for the training of insurance adjustors who handle earthquake 
damage claims.
142
 Citing his belief that earthquake “coverage may not be 
well understood” and noting the “[c]omplex fact questions [which] arise 
when determining whether earth movement has resulted from a covered 
cause or an excluded cause[,]” the Commissioner recommended heightened 
training requirements for adjustors in this field.
143
 Specifically, the 
Commissioner asked that earthquake damage adjustors receive training on 
masonry veneer, high deductible costs, and structural damage.
144
 By terming 
all of these undoubtedly helpful policies as “expectations” and by failing to 
issue corresponding orders, however, the Commissioner has still not gone far 
enough to protect the policyholders he is obligated to safeguard.
145
 
                                                                                                             
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.  
 140. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 141. See BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 3. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. The Oklahoma Insurance Department has issued bulletins for a variety of issues, 
oftentimes clearing up legal uncertainties, see OKLA. INS. DEP’T, BULLETIN NO. PC 2010-05 
AND LH 2010-04: ARBITRATION CLAUSES (Oct. 12, 2010), https://www.oid.ok.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/PC-2010-05-and-LH-2010-04.pdf (discussing arbitration clauses), 
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Unenforced half-measures fall short of the immediate security that injured 
policyholders deserve.  
B. The Transition to Enforceability: The Oklahoma Unfair Claims Settlement 
Practices Act as an Avenue of Redress 
The Commissioner has already demonstrated exactly how these bulletins 
can unambiguously transform into enforceable orders from the OID. In the 
aforementioned “Order In Re: Earthquake Insurance Rates,” the 
Commissioner made clear that he was acting under “the duty of 
administering and enforcing all provisions of the Oklahoma Insurance 
Code.”
146
 Moreover, the OID served its order on “[a]ll licensed property and 
casualty insurers issuing earthquake insurance in the State of Oklahoma.”
147
 
That same language is absent from bulletins 2015-02 and 04, and while that 
absence does not inherently prove a lack of enforceability, it does leave room 
for the Commissioner to clarify its expectations for the industry.
148
 
Oklahoma’s Insurance Code provides the Commissioner and OID with more 
than sufficient authority to see that insurers adhere to the bulletins, just like 
the earthquake rate order.
149
  
Because of the importance of the guidance outlined to insurers in the 
Commissioner’s bulletins, the OID or the Commissioner himself could re-
issue these same bulletins as orders with explicit reference to Oklahoma’s 
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.
150
 Specifically, each of the 
Commissioner’s “expectations” as outlined in the bulletins seem to go to 
specific concerns or provisions of UCSPA.
151
 First, the Commissioner 
expressed concern that insurers were denying coverage on the 
unsubstantiated basis that policyholders’ damage resulted from injection well 
                                                                                                             
or setting expectations from the OID, see JOHN D. DOAK, OKLA. INS. COMM’R, BULLETIN NO. 
PC 2013-07: PUBLIC ADJUSTERS AND FEES (June 14, 2013), https://www.oid.ok.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/061713_public-adjuster-bulletin.pdf (discussing public adjusters 
and fees). 
 146. Order In re: Earthquake Insurance Rates, supra note 64, at 1. Moreover, the notice 
was quite literally labeled as an “Order.” Id.  
 147. Id. at 4.  
 148. Oklahoma law does allow for a state agency to interpret the regulations, and 
occasionally statutes, pertaining to that agency’s scope through bulletins and other issued 
interpretations. See Cox Okla. Telecom, LLC v. State ex rel. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 2007 OK 
55, ¶¶ 23–27, 164 P.3d 150, 160.  
 149. See 36 OKLA. STAT. § 307.1 (Supp. 2018); see also infra Section II.A. 
 150. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.13. The Insurance Code grants the Insurance Commissioner 
with the ability to enforce all orders issued consistent with the Unfair Claims Settlement 
Practices Act. Id. 
 151. See BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73. 
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 the UCSPA punishes insurers who “[k]nowingly misrepresent[] to 
claimants pertinent facts or policy provisions relating to coverages at 
issue.”
153
 Second, the Commissioner worried that insurers were claiming pre-
existing damage without adequately maintaining pre-loss information on 
property;
154
 the UCSPA prohibits insurers from “[f]ailing to adopt and 
implement reasonable standards for prompt investigations of claims arising 
under its insurance policies or insurance contracts.”
155
 Finally, the 
Commissioner feared that insurers had not properly trained adjustors on the 
specifics of earthquake damage;
156
 again, the UCSPA demands that insurers 
maintain reasonable investigative standards.
157
 The Unfair Claims Settlement 
Practices Act then, provides Oklahoma’s Insurance Commissioner with both 
the legal authority to issue orders and several rationales upon which to base 
those orders.  
As this Comment has already noted, orders which derive from the UCSPA 
carry with them significant enforcement power.
158
 With these bulletins re-
issued as orders, the OID and its Commissioner would retain the clear 
authority to crack down on noncompliant insurers. If insurers refused to 
provide a reasonable basis for a denial, maintain pre-loss records of insureds’ 
property, or train claims adjustors to specifically handle earthquake damage, 
the Commissioner would have the ability to take the most severe action 
authorized under Oklahoma law: “revoke or suspend the insurer’s certificate 
of authority.”
159
 Orders consistent with the UCSPA also allow the 
Commissioner to take intermediate steps “to the extent deemed necessary to 
obtain the insurer’s compliance with the order,” presumably including the 
imposition of fines or similar financial penalties.
160
 
The Commissioner’s enforcement of orders under the UCSPA not only 
serves to create stronger and more apparent guidelines by which insurers 
must abide, but such orders and corresponding reprimands would also aid 
plaintiffs pursuing individual cases under the USCPA. While the UCSPA 
exists to serve the regulatory functions of Oklahoma’s Insurance Department, 
violations of the Act are not entirely separated from private causes of action. 
                                                                                                             
 152. Id. at 1–2. 
 153. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(2). 
 154. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 2. 
 155. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(3). 
 156. BULLETIN NO. PC 2015-02, supra note 73, at 3. 
 157. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.5(3). 
 158. See id. § 1250.5. 
 159. Id. § 1250.13(A); see also id. §§ 606–607 (mandating that all insurance carriers 
must maintain a certificate of authority in order to transact business in Oklahoma).  
 160. Id. § 1250.13(A). 
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Though an individual plaintiff cannot bring suit solely for a claimed violation 
of the UCSPA, “the UCSPA can provide the district court [or any trial court] 
with guidance in determining whether particular conduct on the part of an 
insurer is unreasonable and sufficient to constitute a basis for a bad faith 
claim.”
161
 Moreover, the Insurance Commissioner may turn to the state’s 
Attorney General for assistance in enforcing the Commissioner’s orders.
162
 
And if the Attorney General pursues judicial intervention from the state’s 
courts, the insurer is liable for attorney fees should the state prevail.
163
 
Unfortunately, however, the OID has a documented history of regularly 
issuing bulletins, while seldomly following through with more forceful 
orders. As the public record demonstrates, the OID has issued twenty-one 
bulletins since 2010 concerning property and casualty insurance issues.
164
 
Within the same span of time, the Department issued a total of three 
orders.
165
 Not one of the issued orders appears to correspond with the issued 
bulletins.
166
 It seems then that enforcement through the OID has typically 
followed the same pattern: the Commissioner issues a bulletin, threatens 
enforcement of that bulletin, and enforcement never comes.
167
 But there is no 
reason for this trend to continue. The Commissioner can and should buck this 
trend to issue UCSPA follow-up orders to the corresponding earthquake 
bulletins.  
To most effectively ensure compliance with the issues that the Insurance 
Department has noted, the OID would be well-served to convert the 
Commissioner’s bulletins into UCSPA orders and enforce them as such.  
  
                                                                                                             
 161. Beers v. Hillory, 2010 OK CIV APP 99, ¶ 30, 241 P.3d 285, 294.  
 162. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1250.13(A). 
 163. Id. § 1250.13(B).  
 164. Bulletins, supra note 124.  
 165. Commissioner’s Orders, OKLA. INS. DEP’T, https://www.oid.ok.gov/regulated-
entities/rate-and-form-filing/property-and-casualty-insurance/commissioners-orders/ (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Past scholarship on the OID has commented on this same trend. Kelsey D. Dulin, 
The Disaster After the Disaster: Insurance Companies’ Post- Catastrophe Claims Handling 
Practices, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 189, 195 (2008) (“Under existing laws, Oklahoma appears to be 
sufficiently equipped with the tools necessary to bring the insurance industry’s claims 
handling behavior into accord with Oklahoma’s Insurance Code—it is the enforcement of 
existing laws that is lacking.”). 
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III. Moving Forward; Building a Legislative Framework to Better Regulate 
the Earthquake Insurance Market 
While litigation and tightened regulation would both help to rectify 
potential past conduct of earthquake insurers in Oklahoma, the legislature is 
in the best position to outline a clear set of policies to avoid recurring issues. 
Fortunately for the Oklahoma legislature, it is not the first state to experience 
a sudden uptick in seismic activity, followed by a panicked earthquake 
insurance market. California experienced a similar crisis following the 
catastrophic Northridge earthquake of 1994.
168
 Although California’s 
responses to that disaster were then and are now imperfect,
169
 Oklahoma 
would be well-served to follow its example of insurance lawmaking in the 
years after the quake. Specifically, the Oklahoma legislature should strongly 
consider establishing an Oklahoma Earthquake Authority, modeled after the 
California Earthquake Authority. Because the formation of such an agency is 
strongly tied to a legal requirement for insurers to offer earthquake insurance 
to their policyholders, the Oklahoma legislature should pass a similar 
accompanying law. Oklahoma may be able to form its own Authority 
separate and apart from the existence of such a legal mandate, but such a 
requirement would strengthen and attune the state’s market.  
A. An Example Worth Following: The California Earthquake Authority as a 
Model for Oklahoma 
No stranger to seismic activity, California’s insurance industry forever 
changed following one of its most severe earthquakes: the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake just outside of Los Angeles.
170
 Given its proximity to one of the 
world’s most populous cities, the quake caused an estimated $20 billion in 
residential damage, less than half of which was ultimately covered by 
insurance.
171
 Unprepared for an event of this size, 93% of California 
homeowners’ insurers either restricted or altogether withdrew their 
earthquake policies.
172
 In the aftermath of this insurer exodus, Californians 
found it arduous, if not impossible, to locate a carrier who would insure their 
                                                                                                             
 168. Leslie Scism, California’s Earthquake Problem: People Aren’t Scared Enough 
About Them, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2015, 8:15 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
california-pushes-homeowners-to-insure-against-earthquakes-1440980138.  
 169. Some have been critical of the CEA’s slow rate in increasing the number of 
Californians with sufficient earthquake insurance. See id.  
 170. History of the California Earthquake Authority (CEA), CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., 
http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/About-CEA/CEA-History (last visited Jan. 22, 2020). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id.  
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home against the next potential quake.
173
 After two years of proposed 
solutions and political back and forth, the California legislature created the 
first-of-its-kind California Earthquake Authority (CEA).
174
  
Not itself an insurance company, the CEA exists as a “public 
instrumentality of the State of California,” which offers and facilitates the 
offering of earthquake insurance to Californian policyholders.
175
 The CEA 
provides earthquake coverage through this two-fold approach: providing 
CEA “basic residential earthquake insurance” policies and providing the 
ability for CEA-authorized insurers to “sell residential earthquake insurance 
products that supplement or augment the basic residential earthquake 
insurance provided by the authority.”
176
 Through this system, the state 
provides basic coverage while private insurers’ plans fill any existing gaps 
and provide for coverage over and above that baseline. However, and 
importantly, the CEA itself does not sell products directly to the public.
177
 
Instead, CEA participating insurers issue these products pursuant to the CEA 
guidelines and expectations, thus avoiding a significant cost burden to the 
state.
178
 CEA policies are available for standard homeowners, as well as 
mobile home residents, condominium/apartment owners, and renters.
179
  
The CEA formed primarily through the existence of a unique California 
law, under which insurers must offer earthquake homeowners insurance to 
their insureds.
180
 Due to the typically high rate of earthquakes in California, 
the state has required insurers, since the 1980s, to offer earthquake coverage 
to its policyholders as a condition to selling or renewing any homeowners 
                                                                                                             
 173. See id.  
 174. Daniel Marshall, An Overview of the California Earthquake Authority, 21 RISK 
MGMT. & INS. REV. 73, 74–75 (2018) (noting also that the title of the authorizing legislation 
was the Homeowners Insurance Availability Act of 1996) [hereinafter Marshall, Overview 
Article]. 
 175. Id. at 91 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.21).  
 176. Id. (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.27(b)(1)). 
 177. Id. (noting that the CEA provides insurance “through its legal agents”). 
 178. Id. at 91. 
CEA receives no financial support through the California state budget—its sole 
capital comes from private sources (contributions from participating insurance 
companies, accumulations of surplus revenues, accumulated investment 
returns), and its sole revenue comes from premiums realized through sale (by 
participating insurers) of CEA insurance products and from investment returns. 
Id. at 100. 
 179. Id. at 76.  
 180. Id. at 81.  
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 California is, at the time of this writing, the only state in the nation 
with such a requirement.
182
 Policyholders are not under a duty to accept this 
offer, but the insurer must continue to make it available throughout the 
lifespan of the policy.
183
 As the CEA itself explains, “In California, insuring a 
home for earthquake is important enough that the choice to do so belongs—
with certain conditions imposed—to the policyholder, not the insurer.”
184
  
Rates and premium prices for CEA policies are not created or maintained 
by the CEA itself, but through the California Department of Insurance.
185
 By 
putting these rates in the control of this regulatory agency, California avoids 
“noncompetitive” market crises, while generally keeping premiums and 
policy costs low.
186
 As evidence of the regulation’s efficacy, the CEA 
estimates that without its rate control mechanisms, the average premium on 
its policies would more than double.
187
 CEA policies also offer and prescribe 
a range of premiums to better share the risk between insurers and 
policyholders, while maintaining a consistent market.
188
 These rates are based 
on actuarial predictions from the CEA’s internal actuary and finance 
departments.
189
 Independent rate-setting and limited premium and deductible 
ranges ensure uniformity and ease of access for would-be insureds seeking 
earthquake coverage. 
There exists a debate as to the efficacy of the CEA in meaningfully 
increasing the number of earthquake policyholders within its state.
190
 In an 
overview presented to Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business, CEA’s 
general counsel noted that “statewide take-up [also known as policy 
adoption] plummeted after CEA’s start-up.”
191
 However, over a ten-year 
period from 2006-2016, the number of CEA policies in force grew by nearly 
                                                                                                             
 181. Id. at 81–82 (“The offer must state the proposed dwelling, contents, and additional 
living expense limits; the deductible, and the estimated annual premium.”). 
 182. Id. at 82 (noting, however, Kentucky’s regulatory “preference” that such offers be 
made to policyholders regularly but noting no statutory requirement exists).  
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 84.  
 185. Id. at 94.  
 186. See id. at 94–95.  
 187. Id. at 97 fig.8.  
 188. Id. at 105. As of 2016, deductibles are available at 5%, 20%, and 25% of the overall 
coverage limit. Id. 
 189. Id. at 113.  
 190. Id. at 96 (“The question of why so many fewer households buy earthquake 
insurance today, 20+ years after Northridge is frequently posed . . . .”). 
 191. DANIEL MARSHALL, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, POLICY BRIEF NO. 17-03, AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE AUTHORITY 5 (Feb. 2017), https://media.rff.org/ 
documents/RFF-PB-17-03.pdf [hereinafter MARSHALL, RFF POLICY BRIEF].  
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B. The Oklahoma Earthquake Authority as a Legislative Solution 
Because Oklahoma now experiences earthquakes more frequently than 
California,
193
 the legislature should follow the lead of the CEA to protect its 
citizens. Today, Oklahoma is undeniably an earthquake-prone state, and the 
time is past due for its legislators to treat it as such. While the day may come, 
especially with increasingly frequent climate disasters,
194
 for a larger federal-
based disaster insurance program, Oklahoma can begin to confront its issues 
now at the state level.
195
 
First, the Oklahoma legislature should require, not merely allow, insurers 
within the state to offer earthquake coverage both at the sale and annual/bi-
annual renewal of coverage. As discussed, this straightforward law is the 
simple, but unique, underpinning of the CEA and California’s approach to 
earthquake insurance regulation more generally.
196
 While Oklahoma has not 
yet experienced its own Northridge quake,
197
 there is a similar dysfunction 
across the state’s earthquake insurance market that requires vigorous 
legislative intervention in line with California’s novel concept. The 
legislature could even create the Authority with a possible sun-setting 
window to gain wider support, citing the recent decrease in earthquakes 
                                                                                                             
 192. Id. at 6 tbl.2.  
 193. Ehrman, supra note 11, at 612.  
 194. How Can Climate Change Affect Natural Disasters?, USGS, 
https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/how-can-climate-change-affect-natural-disasters-1?qt-
news_science_products=0#qt-news_science_products (last visited Feb. 29, 2020) (noting the 
likelihood of increased natural disasters “with increasing global surface temperatures”).  
 195. The federal government already supplements the private insurance market in one 
area where insurers had trouble containing risk: flood insurance. See Noel King & Nick 
Fountain, Episode 797: Flood Money, NPR (Sept. 29, 2017, 6:36 PM ET), https://www.npr. 
org/sections/money/2017/09/29/554603161/episode-797-flood-money.  
 196. California’s compulsory earthquake insurance offer law passed in 1984. While some 
recognized its general usefulness, scholars at the time were quick to note that the law, in and 
of itself, did not sufficiently protect Californian’s from earthquake market irregularities. See 
generally Jeffrey B. Hare, Comment, Earthquake Insurance: A Proposal for Compulsory 
Coverage, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971 (1984).  
 197. Though many of Oklahoma’s earthquakes cause little damage, “[t]he earthquake 
severity hazard will be high for the next several years because of the energy in those fault 
systems from previous, historical wastewater injection,” per the Oklahoma Geological 
Survey. Ken Miller, Damage Reported After Earthquakes in Oklahoma, FOX NEWS (Mar. 5, 
2018), https://www.foxnews.com/us/damage-reported-after-earthquakes-in-oklahoma 
(quoting Jacob Walter, seismologist with the Oklahoma Geological Survey).  
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consistent with fewer wastewater wells.
198
 With earthquakes established as a 
regular part of Oklahoman life, citizens in the state should have adequate 
protection against the relatively new risks they encounter, not just by choice 
of insurers, but through legal mandate. 
Second, Oklahoma needs to establish its own version of the CEA to better 
protect its citizens and provide for a more stable and predictable market for 
earthquake insurance.
199
 As the CEA general counsel explained in the report 
referenced above, the California model should not remain a novelty to that 
state alone; its principles and foundations remain “transferable and 
practicable.”
200
 It is past time for Oklahoma to transfer these practicable 
lessons to its own insurance market.  
Many, if not perhaps all, of the issues noted (unpaid claims, untrained 
adjustors, and non-competitive markets) in this Comment and by the 
Oklahoma Insurance Department could be proactively addressed through an 
Oklahoma Earthquake Authority. Oklahoma earthquake insurers have created 
a “noncompetitive” marketplace with few options and high premiums.
201
 An 
Oklahoma Earthquake Authority, following the California model, would 
offer earthquake policies subject to consistent and controlled rates and 
premiums. Oklahoma earthquake insurers have created ambiguity as to 
whether their policies cover human-made or induced quakes.
202
 An 
Oklahoma Earthquake Authority, following the California Model, could offer 
clear and uniform definitions, tailored to Oklahoman concerns. Almost as if 
the CEA anticipated an application to Oklahomans and induced quakes, CEA 




                                                                                                             
 198. Oklahoma earthquakes registering a 3.0 or greater have decreased commensurate 
with a regulatory tightening of wastewater injection. Oklahoma Earthquakes Decrease for 
3rd Straight Year, AP NEWS (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/216ddc7f8391467 
c90bd526696beb4f3.  
 199. Under the CEA, Californians still often choose to forego earthquake insurance. Still, 
the CEA creates a more affordable and regulated marketplace. See Liz Pulliam Weston, 
Rethinking Your Stance on Earthquake Coverage, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2000, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-feb-25-fi-2645-story.html; see also Andrew 
Blankstein & Monica Alba, Why Do So Few California Homeowners Have Earthquake 
Insurance, NBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2014, 8:28 AM CDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/ 
investigations/why-do-so-few-california-homeowners-have-earthquake-insurance-n227711. 
 200. MARSHALL, RFF POLICY BRIEF, supra note 191, at 6. 
 201. See supra Section I.B. 
 202. See supra Section I.B. 
 203. Marshall, Overview Article, supra note 174, at 105. 
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Within an Oklahoma Earthquake Authority, these definitions could pay 
particular notice to induced quakes and their underlying causes.
204
 A single, 
precise definition of “earthquake” could similarly dispel disagreements over 
“ground settlement” versus “earthquake” and mandate the inclusion of 
induced quakes in policies upfront, rather than retroactively as the Oklahoma 
Insurance Commissioner has required.
205
 Earthquake policies offered through 
an Oklahoma Earthquake Authority would also help ease market tensions for 
private insurers by mandating the offer of uniform, state-managed policies. 
Similarly, an Oklahoma Earthquake Authority could better regulate 
earthquake insurers in conjunction with the Oklahoma Insurance Department.  
Under the control of an Oklahoma Earthquake Authority modelled after 
the CEA, all private insurers would be required to be a “participating 
insurer.”
206
 For the state to recognize a participating insurer, the CEA 
requires all insurers to enter into an “Insurer Participation Agreement” 
between the insurer and the California Insurance Commissioner.
207
 
Oklahoma, under its own Earthquake Authority, should do the very same, 
essentially creating a heightened and earthquake-specific form of its 
insurance licensure requirements. It is here that the Oklahoma equivalent of 
the CEA could work hand-in-glove with the OID. As discussed, the 
Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner retains control over insurer rules and 
regulations.
208
 Through the OID, the Commissioner could impose 




Most pertinently for Oklahomans, the CEA mandates claims-handling 
requirements for its adjustors, which seem to address some of the concerns 
that the Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner has outlined.
210
 Claims 
representatives under the CEA are required to be trained according to CEA 
                                                                                                             
 204. The Oklahoma Geological Survey (OGS) has dedicated a significant amount of 
scholarship to the circumstances surrounding wastewater induced quakes. The OGS could 
excellently provide these definitions. See Okla. Geological Survey, Statement on Oklahoma 
Seismicity (Apr. 21, 2015), http://wichita.ogs.ou.edu/documents/OGS_Statement-
Earthquakes-4-21-15.pdf.  
 205. See supra Section II.A. 
 206. See For Insurers: Helping Financially Protect Californians from Damaging 
Earthquakes, CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/Insurance-
Professionals/For-Insurers (last visited Jan. 22, 2020). 
 207. Id.  
 208. See 36 OKLA. STAT. § 307.1 (Supp. 2018). 
 209. The Insurance Commissioner maintains the ability to adopt rules and regulations 
pertaining to the Oklahoma Insurance Code. Id. 
 210. See supra Section II.A. 
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claim-handling guidelines and the California version of the UCSPA.
211
 
Among other requirements, “[t]he CEA requires every [participating insurer] 
to comply with the California Department of Insurance regulations that set 
forth standards governing the training of insurance adjusters in evaluating 
damage caused by earthquakes and the procedures for reporting unaccredited 
adjusting.”
212
 Within the CEA claims-handling guidelines itself, the CEA 
encourages insurers to train its adjusters on the difference between 
earthquake damage and other forms of property damage, as well as outlining 
the specifics of the state’s UCSPA.
213
 The Oklahoma Insurance Department 
could monitor compliance with these requirements through its existing 
agency and market conduct review process.
214
 An Oklahoma Earthquake 
Authority would address and more definitely prevent issues of earthquake 
insurance already recognized in the state, while mandating that they do not 
recur in the future.  
To guarantee that participating insurers are following CEA guidelines, 
California requires insurance adjustors to adhere to the Consortium of 
Universities for Research in Earthquake Engineering (CUREE) guidelines in 
adjusting claims.
215
 This thorough CUREE earthquake damage inspection 
checklist ensures that adjustors are checking and noting issues of topography, 
geotechnical issues, wall leaning, foundation cracking, and fireplace cracking 
among its thirty-four required questions.
216
 To this point, the CEA requires a 
completed CUREE checklist as part of a “complete investigation” into claims 
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 214. See 36 OKLA. STAT. § 311.4 (Supp. 2018). 
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than twenty-five universities with the “goal of advancing earthquake engineering research 
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http://www.curee.org/archive/organization.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2020). 
 216. General Earthquake Damage Inspection Checklist, CUREE, https://www. 
curee.org/projects/EDA/docs/EDA-F2-rev1.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2020). The checklist 
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 Because Oklahoma does not mandate this 
requirement as California currently does, there is presumably no demand that 
Oklahoma adjustors follow the instructions of the CUREE checklist. When 
insurers adjust claims in Oklahoma, there is no requirement to abide by a 
proscribed checklist even if compliance with that checklist would otherwise 
constitute claims-handling best practices.  
The specificity of this checklist and its mandatory nature highlight the 
extent to which the CEA, and a potential Oklahoman counterpart, can ensure 
uniformity and consistency in the earthquake claims handling process.
218
 
Moreover, the Oklahoma Insurance Department could work with CUREE to 
better tailor this checklist to Oklahoma-specific concerns (accounting for clay 
soil, wastewater induced quakes, etc.). This itemized checklist, in itself, 
would not entirely cure the worries of Oklahoma’s earthquake insurance 
market. If California, a state with even fewer quakes than Oklahoma,
219
 finds 
these criteria necessary, then Oklahoma should too.  
The Oklahoma legislature maintains the ability to follow California and 
protect its citizens from a market that it already knows to be faulty and often 
unhelpful to those with earthquake insurance. An Oklahoma Earthquake 
Authority would be able to offer Oklahomans a more affordable, basic form 
of earthquake insurance than currently available, while ensuring that such a 
policy remains appropriately priced and rated. Moreover, the Oklahoma 
Earthquake Authority would be able to work in tandem with the state’s 
Insurance Department to prevent existing abuses from recurring by 
mandating heightened requirements on all insurers that would wish to serve 
as a participating insurer in the Authority. It remains to be seen if the 
Oklahoma legislature will ever consider this sweeping reform, or is even 
aware of such a statutory scheme.
220
 The results from the CEA partnered with 
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the recognized flaws in the Oklahoma earthquake insurance market make 
clear, however, that the state and its citizens would be well-served by the 
formation of an Oklahoma Earthquake Authority. 
IV. Conclusion 
Many Oklahomans and their insurers alike presumably never expected the 
state to become the national epicenter of earthquakes and seismic activity. 
Indeed, the state and its citizens are accustomed to taking shelter during 
tornado season and fearing catastrophic wind and hail damage to their 
property,
221
 but few could have predicted the frequency and extent of the 
threat now existing beneath their homes’ foundations. The fact remains, 
however, that despite the near-universal recognition of the cause of the state’s 
earthquake phenomenon,
222
 earthquake insurers in Oklahoma still fail to 
provide their policyholders with adequate coverage to protect against this 
newer risk.  
In the near term, earthquake policyholders whose insurers have 
wrongfully-denied their claim due to an unsubstantiated policy exemption 
should band together in taking their fight to the insurers through doctrine of 
illusory coverage.
223
 Through this litigation strategy, policyholders can 
compel insurers to honor their policy and eliminate the most contemptible 
avenues for excuses and non-payments. More effective and rigid regulation 
from the Oklahoma Insurance Department can clarify the expectations 
between insurers and policyholders and bolster enforcement efforts. By 
realizing the full power of the Insurance Commissioner and the UCSPA, the 
state’s regulatory body can set a clear standard for how earthquake insurers 
should treat consumers and handle claims. Finally, though it is a substantial 
legislative overhaul to be sure, the state legislature should form an Oklahoma 
Earthquake Authority to both offer affordable coverage to all Oklahomans 
and further establish comprehensive expectations for insurers. As the ground 
beneath Oklahomans’ feet continues to shift, these measures through 
litigation, regulation, and legislation can meaningfully assure those with 
earthquake damage that their insurers will honor the terms and spirit of their 
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coverage. Meanwhile, the state’s citizens can do what they have done time 
and time again: rebuild.  
 
Nick A. Marr 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
